1	IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS	
2	EASTERN DIVISION	
3	UNITED STATES OF AMERICA) Docket No. 13 CR 00726
4	Plaintiff	
5	٧.) February 4, 2016) 10:07 a.m.
6	DaJUAN KEY,))
7	Defendant.))
8	TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS - FINAL PRETRIAL CONFERENCE BEFORE THE HONORABLE VIRGINIA M. KENDALL, and a jury	
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10	ADDEADANCES.	
11	APPEARANCES:	
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1 (Proceedings heard in open court:) 2 THE CLERK: 13 CR 726-1, USA versus DaJuan Key. 3 (Defendant enters courtroom.) 4 THE COURT: Good morning. 5 MS. WINSLOW: Good morning, your Honor. Heather 6 Winslow on behalf of DaJuan Key. 7 MR. O'CONNELL-MILLER: Good morning, your Honor. 8 Leighton O'Connell-Miller, also on behalf of DaJuan Key. 9 THE COURT: Good morning. 10 Good morning, Mr. Key. 11 MS. SAWYER: Good morning, your Honor. Katherine 12 Sawyer and Christopher Parente on behalf of the United States. 13 THE COURT: Okay. Good morning. 14 We have a number of things to wrap up here. 15 some rulings -- some more rulings for you. And then I don't 16 think I got anything from you on one of the things that I was waiting on. 17 18 MS. WINSLOW: Which was -- what's that, your Honor? 19 THE COURT: I thought I gave you more time to file a 20 supplement to admit the charges against Agent Landau as 21 evidence of bias. 22 MS. WINSLOW: Oh, I thought you determined that they 23 were not admissible. 24 THE COURT: Oh, okay. 25 MS. WINSLOW: And we don't object to that. That's

fine.

THE COURT: Okay. All right.

MR. O'CONNELL-MILLER: The only thing, I think there's the --

COURT REPORTER: I'm sorry, I can't hear you.

MR. O'CONNELL-MILLER: I'm sorry. The April testimony was the only thing. There was a motion to extend time until today, and that's something we do want to discuss, a phone message we had from April's attorney indicating that she was going to assert her Fifth Amendment rights, but we don't know the scope of that. And I played the voice-mail message for the government. We're going to try to all get in touch with her later today.

THE COURT: Okay. Because we'll need to know that before trial.

All right. So let me address one outstanding motion, which is the motion to strike the testimony in the original suppression hearing based upon the fact that the government did not turn over the grand jury testimony of that witness that was within its possession.

And we start with the understanding that that is the factual basis -- hang on a second -- the factual basis that it was in the government's possession isn't in dispute. But what happened was that one of the issues at the suppression hearing was that the defendant had consented to the police's entry into

his hotel room that day, and the three law enforcement officers who testified that the defendant responded to their knock at the hotel room door and then voluntarily allowed them into their room.

So this witness Crayton, which is the subject of this particular motion, she testified that they entered the room without knocking or being invited.

So at issue is this transcript of Crayton's testimony that was before the grand jury in October of 2013, which is two years -- almost two full years prior to her testimony on the witness stand.

And she testified before the grand jury: After talking to Marie, I left the McDonald's and I went back to our hotel room at Super 8 where Amillie was waiting, we were each laying on one of the beds when the police arrived at the room, they placed Amillie under arrest, and I went with another police officer.

Now, oddly -- or should I say uniquely -- the defendant is arguing that this testimony is consistent with her testimony before the Court at the suppression hearing. And since she called the witness, she wanted to use that as a prior consistent statement to rehabilitate Crayton.

And the government's position is, well, we had no obligation to turn that over to her because she wasn't our witness, and there was no material difference between the

testimony before the grand jury and her testimony in court and, therefore, it can't be a *Brady* violation.

So I think we have to look at it from a couple of different perspectives.

Of course, the defense proposal is that it's a *Brady* violation and, therefore, her testimony should be stricken. So *Brady* occurs when the evidence is favorable to the accused, and it's either exculpatory or impeaching, and it must have been suppressed by the government either willfully or inadvertently and there's a reasonable probability that prejudice ensued. So, in other words, that's the materiality component that I just mentioned to you a moment ago.

So, first, the evidence was suppressed. It's suppressed for purposes of *Brady* where they failed to disclose it in time for the defendant to make use of it and the evidence was not otherwise available to the defendant through the exercise of reasonable diligence. They did have the same information with the defendant's summary of her interview.

This is where the issue is unique in that the information that was provided to the defense was not inconsistent with the information that was in the grand jury.

Under the Rule 3500, once the government calls a witness, the government must turn over whatever statements it has within its possession. That evidence has to be turned over under 35, and then you would have the ability -- and that's the

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old way of -- that's what the rule states, but of course I have discretion to order it earlier than that.

So here government says, "Well, I didn't call this witness," even though this witness is someone that they have on their witness list, that they're relying on as someone to give key testimony to -- or for, for their 404(b) motion and some other motions, but they didn't call her. So I grappled for a while with this concept of at the moment that she finished her testimony, why the government didn't reach into its bag and say here is the grand jury testimony from two years earlier that we've had, and they didn't do that. Because even though they didn't call her, there would have been the ability for the defense to judge whether or not this witness had something inconsistent. And that's just not right that you didn't turn over the grand jury testimony after she testified, under 3500. And you made the call as to whether it was inconsistent or material. And in a situation where we're already in court and she's on the stand, it behooves any prosecutor to turn over a prior statement.

Fortunately for the prosecutors, they're saved by the fact that the statement is consistent. And I think that makes this a different call, even though I don't think it was the right call to have been made by the government.

Prior consistent statements do have the potential to effect the fact-finder's view of a witness's credibility. And

under *Brady*, the prosecutor isn't required to deliver his entire file, but to disclose evidence favorable to the accused if suppressed would deprive the defendant a fair trial.

So Ms. Winslow's position is, well, I would have liked to have rehabilitated her to say she's not lying today, this is exactly what she said before.

I was the fact-finder in this situation. I was the person that had all the information now at my disposal. And this issue of materiality and the reasonable probability that it would have, had it been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different is where the government's action is protected.

In this case, there's no reasonable probability that the suppression hearing would have turned out differently if the defendant had had the grand jury testimony.

The three officers were consistent with their statements, and her grand jury and statement to the FBI was consistent. And for that reason, that consistency makes it not a material issue that would have affected the outcome of the suppression hearing.

So Crayton didn't testify before the grand jury that the officers entered without knocking or announcing. She didn't provide any information regarding how they came inside the room. It's possible that Crayton and Key were each laying on one of the beds when the police arrived, as she testified

before the grand jury, and that Key answered the door and consented, as the Court found after the first hearing.

So given the facts of the case and the substantial evidence undermining her testimony at the suppression hearing that the officers entered the room without consent, I think the government's failure to disclose this grand jury testimony did not undermine the confidence in my initial order.

And I'll put this up online.

I don't think it was the right practice. I think that if you have a statement of a witness, even if called by the defense, especially in light of the way you have embraced her testimony to be part of the motions that you filed as a government witness to support her, that you should have given the grand jury testimony to Ms. Winslow when she finished testifying, at the latest. So that is, in my mind, probably negligence. Fortunately for you, I'm not finding it to be a Brady violation because I don't think it's materially inconsistent, and it wouldn't have affected the outcome of my decision.

So that is for the outstanding issue on the motion to strike.

I still am working on the law, and I will have a ruling for you today on his statement. I'm not completed with my opinion on whether or not his statement should be suppressed.

I've given you my ruling on the 404(b), and I am excluding it.

I do find that under *Gomez* and its progeny that it is propensity evidence. And I think the charge is narrow enough that we should only be admitting evidence that goes directly to the intent to have this particular victim engage in prostitution. And I personally think that will protect you if you get a conviction anyway because the case law is clear that it's prejudicial to have these other acts by other victims and other prostitutes, I think would fall right into the *Gomez* new direction from the Seventh Circuit, and that it's very likely that the admissibility if upon conviction, if you get a conviction, would be a reversal.

So I'm not going to admit the 404(b), as you saw in my ruling vesterday.

Did you turn over your summary chart as directed?

MS. SAWYER: We don't have any, your Honor.

THE COURT: Oh, okay. And what about -- so there was a motion to admit summary charts. That's withdrawn, I assume, then?

MS. SAWYER: It is, your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay. And then the motion to admit the exhibits filed in support of the government's reply, is there any objection to that one? I think that was taken under advisement.

MS. WINSLOW: Are we referring to the backpage ads? THE COURT: Yeah.

MS. WINSLOW: The backpage ads that involve the -involve April, that's not at issue. The other backpage ads --

THE COURT: It's been stricken under the 404(b) now. There won't be evidence about the other -- other victims.

MS. WINSLOW: Precisely.

THE COURT: I do have your agreed protective order, which is spartan, but at least covers one aspect of 3509, but it's not signed, so I'm going to pass that forward and have all of you sign it so we get it on the record, please.

And then, most importantly, I have received in the last 24 hours two filings from Mr. Key himself. And I'm going to start by addressing those in the way that I always address those, and then we'll get to the substance.

First and foremost, Mr. Key, you are represented by counsel. When you are represented by counsel, I do not take any of the motions as motions filed in your case because she's the one that files on your behalf. So these will not be addressed by me unless -- and this is the second part of the analysis -- unless you have reached a point with your defense counsel where you believe that you should not have her represent you anymore because of a significant divergence of opinion on how your case should be handled.

She has been vigorously defending your case, as has

the attorney before you.

I will say if your issue is ineffectiveness, I do not see it at all. If your issue is something else, I'm going to ask your attorney and not you first as to whether this has been resolved.

MS. WINSLOW: In my opinion, based on our recent communications, this has been resolved. This motion before you was a point of disagreement. It does not in my opinion amount to a total breakdown or even a partial breakdown of communications. Our communication has been really actually exceptional the last few days, last week. I did not see it as a -- as a non-frivolous motion. Therefore, I did not file it. Mr. Key disagreed, and he filed it with the understanding that your Honor would not consider it.

THE COURT: Okay. So I need to ask you directly, because you did give me these filings, whether you are satisfied with Ms. Winslow and that you're working together with her to prepare your defense for this trial. Are you?

THE DEFENDANT: Well, I'm working together with her.

THE COURT: Come on over here, please.

THE DEFENDANT: I'm working together with her to get me prepared for trial. I thought -- well, from my understanding, I want to be able to explain well to get all my things that I feel like are issues in front of the Court, because I know on appeal, if I do get found guilty, I would

like these things I have to appeal. So anything I file and I file for record is based on appeal rights, because I don't want to give any of my appeal rights up, so I want to make sure that I get everything out in the open that I feel that I have some type of concern about from my point of standing, where I look at the law and see things that she might don't see. You know what I'm saying? So I try to get everything out there on docket for if I have to I can bring it back up.

THE COURT: Okay. That's exactly what you can't do, you cannot do that, because what I'm telling you now is this is the person trained in the law, this is the person who knows the law. If you have some issue that you want to preserve for appeal, the way it works is you say: Here's my issue, Attorney. She says: That issue is not one that I can present under the law and the facts, so I can't file it under my obligations of Rule 11 as a lawyer. Or she says: This is one that I can file. And she uses her legal judgment to file it, and she works out an agreement with you as to which ones will be filed.

If she's not filing it, my -- what I'm hearing is there is not a legal basis for this to be presented to me based upon my obligations to you, Judge, as an officer of the court.

And so these are not preserving your record because they won't be considered because I'm only considering things filed by her.

So if you think that there is something that she is not doing and you're reaching some point of irreconcilable presentation, that's when we decide about whether or not this is a significant enough conflict.

But this is exactly what you can't do. (Indicating.) She's the one trained in the law. She's presenting the motions to me after discussing with you what can be presented.

I'm not going to consider them.

THE DEFENDANT: Can I speak?

THE COURT: Absolutely.

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THE DEFENDANT: Every single motion, every single hearing that I had inside this court is me. I looked up every single case. I found everything on my own. Everything. Every -- Candace Jackson, I filed on. I had to give her the paperwork. I had to tell her. She didn't want to do nothing for me. I had to do it myself. So every time I bring something to this Court, it's from me.

THE COURT: Okay. If it's from you and you're presenting it to her and she's presenting what you want presented to the Court, then you're represented appropriately, and she's using her legal expertise to raise the issues to the Court.

> THE DEFENDANT: Uh-hum.

THE COURT: Is that what's going on?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes. Yes. It been going on for a

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But at the same time, like I told you, I protect myself because when I was telling my old lawyer about the hotel and she saying I ain't -- it ain't -- I ain't have arguments and stuff like that, that it wasn't a law and everything, so it was like a back-to-back thing where going back and forth. So now I'm at the point where I have to look it up for myself because I feel if I don't, then ...

THE COURT: Is there something in these two motions that you believe that she is not presenting to you -presenting to me?

THE DEFENDANT: Well, I think we just had a disagreement on the motions itself because I felt like that she was coerced to say me because the police threaten her.

MS. WINSLOW: By she, he means April.

THE DEFENDANT: April. They threatened her. They hit her with the paper. They pulled her desk from under her. She kept telling them, no, it wasn't -- I ain't do nothing. And they forced her to say. And it's in the video.

THE COURT: Then when she testifies, you will have the opportunity to cross -- your attorney will have the opportunity to cross-examine her --

THE DEFENDANT: Yes.

THE COURT: -- and challenge whether it was the truth that she said to them. So that's preserved for trial. Ms. Winslow has had many trials in this building. She'll be

able to cross-examine using her skills. So that's preserved for you.

And so you moved to exclude her, but you can't move to exclude the victim of the case that has provided a statement to the government that says that she's been victimized by you. You don't have the right to exclude her just because you don't think she's telling the truth.

You do have a confrontation clause right to confront her when she's on the witness stand, challenge her with that statement, and attempt to disprove that statement to the jury. And that's your constitutional right, and you're going to exercise it. And Ms. Winslow is going to cross-examine her.

THE DEFENDANT: Okay. Thank you.

THE COURT: Okay. So are you satisfied that you're going to have that proper representation at trial then?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes.

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THE COURT: Okay. And that you're satisfied that Ms. Winslow is going to continue to represent you.

THE DEFENDANT: Yes.

THE COURT: Okay. All right. So what else do we need to address? We've got some jury instructions, I think.

MS. WINSLOW: Jury instructions. And also both parties filed some brief voir dire.

THE COURT: Oh, okay.

MS. WINSLOW: I filed mine relatively early this

this morning -- is the government's filing on the proposed

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to why it would bother them, if it does.

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Do you have an objection?

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MS. WINSLOW: I do, Judge. And I actually proposed what I think is a simpler version of that same question as my Voir Dire 1.

THE COURT: All right. Let me see.

Yeah, sexual conduct can be like, you know, a romance, a rom-com, or it can be prostitution. I think we really want to ask them whether they have issues regarding prostitution.

MS. WINSLOW: I believe they will be asked that with the last question of your Honor's standard voir dire. It already asks them -- they will be advised of the nature of the case, and then they're asked whether or not that's an issue that they can judge fairly, so I think it's repetitive.

THE COURT: The last question on mine says solely is there anything about the facts of the case that you've heard. Right?

MS. WINSLOW: Yes.

THE COURT: All right. Yeah, I think that we should do Number 1. I think it will be beneficial to you. This will be one of those that they respond to at sidebar if they have strong feelings. And so it's going to be worded the way I usually word these.

Do any of you have strong feelings with the prospect of hearing such evidence?

And that will be, when they give us the sidebar,

you'll be able to cross, rehabilitate, whatever you want to do, and so will you. So that way I think you can find out whether there's issues.

I'm not going to ask the entire group about legalization of prostitution. I don't need to get into anybody's legislative opinions.

But if we do get a strong feeling on prostitution issue, you go ahead on the sidebar and inquire about that. So I think that will be appropriate for you.

And the third one is really a follow-up to the first, which at sidebar you can inquire about. If they do say that they think that prostitution is fine and it shouldn't be illegal, then go ahead and ask them, would you feel differently if it was someone under 18. But that will be outside of the presence of the jury.

So what I'm saying is Number 1 will be asked with an altered version of the wording. 2 and 3 is permissible to be asked at sidebar. And then I think that 4 would be whether you or a close friend or family member has had any -- I think maybe it is as broadly worded as we can get it -- experiences that would make it difficult for you to be impartial in judging a case involving prostitution. I think that's helpful. I think you want to know that, and so that that one will be asked.

And I'm not going to ask the question about whether you disbelieve a person just because it's involving

LAW CLERK: I did not.

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THE COURT: All right. Well, I don't have them in the
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      order that I want them in.
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               Can you direct me to which ones we were in dispute,
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      please?
               MS. SAWYER: I can, your Honor.
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               Starting with Government's, in the old version,
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      Instruction Number 4 --
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               THE COURT: Okay.
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               MS. SAWYER: -- we agreed to strike the stipulation
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      language, which we've done.
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               THE COURT: Okay. Hang on. Let me just get -- so do
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      you want me to follow with what was filed on the 29th? Or do
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      you want me to -- is that the latest one?
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               MS. SAWYER: The latest one, your Honor, I believe was
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      filed on the 29th, yes. That was the date of the pretrial
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      conference.
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               The only thing is the numbers have shifted because we
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      took one out.
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               THE COURT: Right. You took some out. Okay. So --
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               MS. SAWYER: I believe Number 4 is still Number 4,
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      though.
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               THE COURT: Okay. And you removed stipulation. And
     you don't have any problem with that?
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               MS. WINSLOW: No.
                                 No, your Honor.
               THE COURT: Okay. All right. That's fine.
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MS. SAWYER: The next one was Government Instruction 1 2 19 from the old version, which is now omitted from this 3 version, was about summary charts. We took that out. 4 THE COURT: Okay. And there's no objection to that? No, your Honor. 5 MS. WINSLOW: 6 THE COURT: Okay. MS. SAWYER: Just for the Court's information, your 7 8 Honor, I think that now, given the Court's 404(b) ruling, there 9 need to be some additional amendments here, which I can make 10 today to reflect the Court's ruling. And there were a couple 11 that the Court took under advisement. I haven't addressed 12 those because obviously we're not there yet, but I just wanted 13 to draw the Court's attention to those. 14 THE COURT: Okay. 15 MS. SAWYER: And then I think the main subject of our 16 discussion --17 THE COURT: Is what's on 22. 18 MS. SAWYER: Correct, is what's on I believe now 19 Government's 21 through -- sorry, it's going to be Government 20 Exhibit -- I'm sorry, Government Instruction 22, correct, 22-A, 21 and then 25, 26, and 27 on the new version. 22 THE COURT: Okay. So the -- let's start with 22, the 23 elements instruction. 24 So Element Number 1: Knowingly transported Victim 1 25 in interstate commerce. Victim 1 was less than 18. And the

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defendant intended that Victim 1 engage in prostitution. And then bracketed you have, "Which, if it had occurred, the defendant would have committed the criminal offense of prostitution."

I'm not sure why you have that bracketed like that. Because you don't need that bracketed, right?

I think if we are exactly where we were MS. SAWYER: with the indictment as it stands, I think that's correct, that we don't need the --

THE COURT: You make the indictment. You're the executive branch.

What I was telling you last week, and I said to you before, is that 2423(a) has two components. It's either for prostitution or it's for a sex act that anyone could be charged with. And it's and/or. You could charge all of them if you That's your decision. It's your choice. And then I wanted. said to you that, of course, 2423(a), the Mann Act is an old It's a very old statute that Congress hasn't fixed to statute. the extent of comporting with laws nationwide that prostitution can't be for a child. That's all I said. But you can stick with it. It's your choice. You make your decision.

So you can charge prostitution or you can charge a sex And obviously you're sticking with prostitution, from what you've got here.

MS. SAWYER: Yes. Yes, your Honor. But I guess we

were seeking clarification from the Court because we wanted to be certain that the Court's -- that we understood the Court's position and that we weren't misunderstanding it. We wanted to make sure that it was not the Court's position that because a juvenile cannot be prosecuted for prostitution in the State of Illinois, that somehow the indictment was defective because it relied on the prostitution prong.

THE COURT: I am not making that -- that would make me have to be in the legislative branch or to rule on a motion to dismiss the indictment, which is not before me. I don't have a motion to dismiss the indictment.

MS. WINSLOW: You don't, although I have one in my computer that will be filed, depending on the outcome of this.

Judge, it's our understanding that -- and we agree with your understanding of the law -- that a minor cannot engage in prostitution in the State of Illinois. That may be different in other states. Because this is a federal law, it makes sense that the law is written as it is. If there are other states that still consider a minor able to engage in prostitution, then it makes sense that this applies to all 50 states. The government could have charged the second prong, but it didn't.

THE COURT: Right. But you have to be able to say in your motion to dismiss the indictment, if you can, that because all of the 50 states now say that that is a commercial sex act

of a minor or exploitation of a minor or sexual abuse of a minor, however it's defined, that it doesn't define the activity that is defined in the statute. It criminalizes prostitution. And it criminalizes it for someone under 18.

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MS. WINSLOW: But the State of Illinois doesn't recognize the crime of prostitution for someone under 18, which is why the government could have, but didn't, charge under the second prong of that statute.

THE COURT: Oh, no. They could have charged under the second prong.

MS. WINSLOW: They absolutely could have, but they didn't.

THE COURT: No, I actually think that -- what I was trying to say to you last time -- and I'm saying again -- is the alternative is that you're charged for the purposes of prostitution or any criminal act for which he can be charged. And he certainly can be charged, as I said in my 404(b). He can be charged with recruiting a minor for a commercial sex act under the federal statute of human trafficking. He can be charged with aiding and abetting the, you know, the sexual abuse of a minor if he put her into prostitution under state And under the old -- under this old statute, that would be defined by whatever happened to her. You know?

MS. WINSLOW: But he wasn't charged.

THE COURT: No, no, he is charged with it.

1 MS. WINSLOW: He's --

THE COURT: He's charged with -- oh, you're saying because he wasn't charged with another sexual act.

MS. WINSLOW: Yes. Precisely. He was simply -- he was only charged under the prostitution portion of that statute. There is an "or." But the government only charged with committing an act of prostitution.

(Counsel conferring.)

THE COURT: Okay. So then if that's your theory and that because they didn't say any sexual activity for which any person can be charged, you have to be able to say that the statute is somehow unconstitutional because since 2010 all of the states have said that it's not -- the act is not prostitution, the act is sexual abuse. So it's really the definition of prostitution. And it doesn't constitutionally negate the statute. It's just that the language is old, and they haven't touched it.

MS. WINSLOW: The language is old, but it's also that the government has failed to -- and it's literally already drafted, it was just based on your Honor's ruling. The government has failed to charge a crime in this case because the minor cannot commit an act of prostitution. It's a legal impossibility. And the government could never present the evidence necessary to prove beyond a reasonable doubt. It's a legal impossibility. There's no evidence that it could present

that would show that April committed an act of prostitution because prostitution, as it pertains to minors, does not exist in the State of Illinois.

THE COURT: Okay. Go ahead.

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MR. PARENTE: Judge, it's the government's position, just so we're clear, that we don't -- the statute doesn't require the government to prove that the minor could be charged in the state for committing the crime of prostitution.

THE COURT: I get that.

MR. PARENTE: Okay. So the statute criminalizes the defendant's intent that she engage. As the Court knows, it doesn't even matter if she actually does engage --

THE COURT: Exactly.

MR. PARENTE: -- in an act --

THE COURT: Yeah.

MR. PARENTE: -- of prostitution. So it's our position that the indictment as charged is correct.

We could have charged a whole bunch of different ways and other things, we didn't, and that's why we're going forward But it's our position that there's no defect in the indictment. And the Illinois legislature's decision to immunize a minor from being prosecuted has nothing to do with this federal statute which criminalizes his intent that the minor engage in the act of prostitution.

THE COURT: Right. I just don't think that the

State's defining the act differently negates also the intent of 1 2 this original statute, which was to transport a minor to have 3 her engage in -- they could have said a commercial sex act. 4 mean, that's really the difference. 5 MS. WINSLOW: It is. 6 THE COURT: It's prostitution or a commercial sex act. 7 And they're the same thing. 8 MS. WINSLOW: I suppose they are the same thing, 9 except when your -- when the interest is a minor in this case, 10 and Illinois has taken the extra steps to make it the law of 11 the state that a minor cannot engage in, and I think -- I guess 12 I would disagree with your Honor --13 THE COURT: Okay. 14 MS. WINSLOW: -- with all due respect, that a 15 commercial sex act is not prostitution. 16 THE COURT: What's the difference to you? 17 MS. WINSLOW: I don't -- I don't think that there's a 18 difference, and I think both of them are not a crime under 19 Illinois law. They don't exist. 20 THE COURT: Well, no, I --21 MS. WINSLOW: As to a minor. 22 THE COURT: But that's the problem, see? Because the 23 criminal activity is against your client, not against the minor. 24

So the problem with the statute is just the old

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language of calling it prostitution that -- you know, to engage in prostitution.

It would have been more enlightened and advanced in this day and age that the language be changed to say "engaged in a commercial sex act."

MS. WINSLOW: Except the statute, as it reads now, says "prostitution." It hasn't been changed.

THE COURT: But you don't think there's a difference between the two.

MS. WINSLOW: It says "prostitution." And under Illinois law, a minor cannot commit an act of prostitution.

THE COURT: But it doesn't matter if the minor can't commit it. Right?

MS. WINSLOW: Except I think under the statute, and I don't have --

THE COURT: It matters whether what he does is criminal, not what she does. It's just the language of how they've charged it --

MS. WINSLOW: It is.

THE COURT: I mean, the language of the old Mann Act, which goes all the way back to, like, when the mafia was bringing, you know, prostitutes across state lines, that was the whole concept when it was first enacted. And it's been a solid statute in that regard forever. It's just that it's inconsistent now with our enlightened view that children are

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      not prostitutes, they're child abuse victims.
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               MS. WINSLOW: All of this is true, but if I could just
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      indulge -- if you would --
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               THE COURT: Sure.
               MS. WINSLOW: -- just indulge me a minute, if I could
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      read you the indictment as it's charged.
               THE COURT: Go right ahead.
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               MS. WINSLOW: And I'm sure -- I know you've read it.
               "In or around September of 2013, in the Northern
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      District of Illinois, Eastern Division, and elsewhere, DaJuan
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      Key, a/k/a Amillie, defendant herein, knowingly transported
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      Victim 1, an individual who had not attained the age of 18
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      years, in interstate commerce from the State of Wisconsin to
      the State of Illinois with the intent that Victim 1 engage in
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      prostitution."
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               THE COURT: Uh-hum.
               MS. WINSLOW: So as it's charged, it's the intent that
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      April engage in prostitution. It's not charging Mr. -- it's
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      charging Mr. Key's intent with transporting her, but her act of
      prostitution.
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               THE COURT: Okay. So here -- no. You're wrong.
                                                                 And
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      I'll tell you why. I disagree, and I'll tell you why.
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          (Laughter.)
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               MS. WINSLOW:
                             That's fine, Judge.
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               THE COURT: Believe me, they will tell me whether I'm
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wrong. And they do plenty.

So the -- it is not her intent to engage in the activity or that she actually engage in the activity. As Mr. Parente said first, she doesn't even have to engage in the activity. But, remember, if you looked at the second prong, it enlightens you on this.

"Or any sexual activity for which any person can be charged with a criminal offense." And usually that "any person" is the defendant, not the victim, but the defendant, and whether the defendant could be charged.

So like in a situation where you're transporting a minor and engaged in a sex act, that it would be intercourse with a child or sexual abuse of a child, and that would be the definition. It would say transported from Illinois to Indiana. In Indiana law, it's illegal for an adult to have sex with a child. You know, that would be the "or" prong.

So the focus is on the illegal activity for the defendant, not on the illegal act of the prostitution. The focus is on the intent and the act of your client, not on the victim.

MS. WINSLOW: I don't disagree with anything your Honor said, respectfully, except the fact that the government didn't charge the last part of the statute. They didn't charge that second -- that second prong. And I think if that's the theory under which the government is going to proceed, then it

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THE COURT: It's not -- I'm hearing they're going to proceed under prostitution, and I just addressed what I think is an archaic term for the Mann Act, but it's not illegal and it's not unconstitutional. Prostitution -- do you have a definition for prostitution?

MR. PARENTE: We do, your Honor.

THE COURT: Does it say commercial sex act or something like it?

MS. SAWYER: I can find --

MS. WINSLOW: Instruction 25, Judge, in the new instructions.

THE COURT: Yeah. So it's true that he -- if the allegations are true that that was the intent, to engage in a sexual act in exchange for money or other valuable consideration.

> Judge --MR. PARENTE:

MS. WINSLOW: Except that --

THE COURT: So I don't really sit as, like, a super legislator, like, redrafting. I sit only to see whether the issue is -- if the indictment is unconstitutional. have a motion challenging it as such. And I raised the issue primarily about language and the language you were going to continually use to the jury regarding the abuse of a minor. And I think that we should be enlightened when we have your

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Department of Justice issuing every year missives regarding how prosecutors should be aware of these -- the language in the statutes and how they should be treating victims, et cetera, so I think that we're going to have a jury here, we should do it the right way. That doesn't mean that I'm going to negate a statute because it is unconstitutional to say that a minor engaging in prostitution can no longer be a minor engaged in prostitution. It's more of a semantic -- it's more of semantics, you know, that -- whether prostitution is a commercial sex act. I think. It's more of the diction of the statute.

MR. PARENTE: Judge, just to I quess come full circle, what I think, what I at least am hearing, is when defense counsel continues to say that the Illinois legislature is saying that a minor can't engage in prostitution, that's not what they're saving.

The Illinois legislature is saying a minor cannot be prosecuted for engaging in prostitution.

And the best evidence of that is that Illinois, in the State of Illinois, you can still be prosecuted for the crime of promoting the prostitution of a minor, so they still -- even the State itself recognizes this.

THE COURT: Right. Right. And my description and my presentation to you regarding this issue was really to make sure that as we are talking and discussing the evidence in

front of this jury, that we're not doing so in such a way that 1 2 we are misunderstanding what is the enlightened view of child 3 exploitation. And I don't think the statute is 4 unconstitutional. And if they want to stick with prostitution, they can stick with prostitution. 5 6 MS. WINSLOW: I will file the motion today. 7 basically just outlined the argument in the motion. 8 THE COURT: Now, remember, under the new rules of 9 criminal procedure, you had an obligation to attack an 10 indictment at the earliest stages, which is now two years ago. 11 MS. WINSLOW: It is two years ago, although under Rule 12 12, I just need to bring this motion before trial. 13 THE COURT: I'll take a look. 14 MS. WINSLOW: That's fine. 15 Also with respect to the Government's Instruction 22, 16 the government repeatedly refers to April as Victim 1. As your Honor said, there is no Victim 2. 17 second --18 19 THE COURT: I think you agreed in your protective 20 order to call her by her first name, so you need -- didn't you? 21 MR. PARENTE: We did, Judge. I think the only issue 22 there is the actual indictment referred to her as Victim 1 --23 THE COURT: 0h. 24 MR. PARENTE: -- and that's why we kept it. We've 25 changed it in every other demonstrative exhibit that we're

using, but the indictment does say Victim 1.

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MS. WINSLOW: And I obviously didn't have any control over what the indictment said when it was brought. "victim," it leads to a legal conclusion, Judge. And I think that it needs to be -- indictments are redacted or changed all the time for the purposes of trial. And when you're presenting April as victim, it very, very strongly suggests to the jury that, particularly in jury instructions, very, very strongly suggests to the jury that you're endorsing the government's position that she is, in fact, a victim, and I think it needs to be changed to "April."

THE COURT: Well, she is charged as the victim. mean, if you're -- I thought -- I thought you were going down a completely different path.

I mean, if you're going down the path that there's multiple victims and this is prejudicial in the sense that she's labeled 1 and there might be 2, 3, or 4, I thought that's where you were going. But the fact that she's labeled "the victim" by them, that's who she is, according to their evidence.

MS. WINSLOW: According to their evidence, but these are the jury instructions. The government -- or -- it's the jury's job to decide whether she's a victim.

THE COURT: Right. But they have to charge -- they have to give her some name, and they're not permitted to give her name name in the 3509 section.

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MS. WINSLOW: They're not, but we can change it to I mean, that's the agreement, that she would be referred to by her first name and not by this legally conclusive term of "victim." That's for the jury to decide.

THE COURT: What's your position on that?

MR. PARENTE: Judge, we believe that it should stay with what was found by the grand jury in the indictment. don't think at the end of this it's a game changer.

Obviously, I can look into this issue. I don't know what the case law says on changing --

THE COURT: I -- well, I don't either, but I -- you know, you can always change things like, you know, VIN numbers on guns or serial numbers -- I mean, VINs on cars or serial numbers on guns and titles of, you know, weapons that are possessed in statutes without going back to the grand jury, but I don't know if it's -- I don't know if it's necessarily prejudicial if the charge says that he transported this individual and if convicted he would -- she definitely would be a victim. So you're saying the term "victim" is what's prejudicial.

> MS. WINSLOW: I am.

MR. PARENTE: I mean --

THE COURT: Go ahead.

MR. PARENTE: Would the word "minor" --

prostitution.

that we can assure that the jury has agreed on the particular transportation.

The government -- to find that the government has proven this, you must agree unanimously on which particular

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occasion the defendant transported April, as well as all of the other elements.

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And I think it would better protect the record if we had a special verdict and indicated which transportation they agreed upon.

THE COURT: What is the evidence that you have two transports?

MS. SAWYER: Your Honor, I don't even think we have an objection to this. We just didn't reflect it in the verdict form. There is an instruction regarding unanimity.

What happens is he brings April down on September 8th, and then there's a subsequent trip back up to Wisconsin with both young women, and then back into Illinois on the 9th. And so presumably on that evidence, they could find either on the 8th or the 9th that he brought her into the State of Illinois for that purpose.

THE COURT: Okay. So then we do need the special verdict form to make sure that they have unanimity on which transport.

MS. SAWYER: I think that's appropriate, your Honor, yes.

THE COURT: All right. So other than that and the state being wrong, have we fixed that jury instruction?

MS. WINSLOW: Yes, your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay. What was the next one, Ms. Sawyer,

since I'm not working with the disputed ones?

MS. SAWYER: 25, 26, and 27, though those might be resolved now following your discussion.

THE COURT: So is there an objection -- well, and I'm looking at your new ones, so let's just make sure.

25 now is the prostitution definition. Is there an objection to the prostitution definition?

MS. WINSLOW: No, your Honor.

THE COURT: And then 26, which is it is not necessary for the government to prove that a criminal sexual act was the sole purpose.

MS. WINSLOW: No objection to that.

THE COURT: Okay. And then whether the victim consented to being transported or to traveling is irrelevant.

MS. WINSLOW: Is irrelevant, and as is the jury instruction.

I don't think this is a proper instruction. The government can certainly argue, I suppose, if it wants to, or the Court can take judicial notice of the fact of consent, but this is not -- this is in addition to the pattern instructions. It provides the jury with, again, the government's theory of the case through the instructions from the Court, which I always think is inappropriate. There's not going to be an argument in this case, I understand -- I don't understand that there will be -- from the government that she was coerced or

1 forced.

THE COURT: Well, I'm going to reserve this one. And the reason I'm going to reserve it is I want to see how it plays out with the evidence at trial. But if there is cross-examination that discusses that she knowingly wanted to go down for the purposes of prostitution, that would be a legal mistake not to tell them that she has -- she has no ability to consent to being engaged in a commercial sex act.

MS. WINSLOW: I can tell you right now that there won't be argument, cross-examination, or any other presentation that she wanted to come down here for the purpose of prostitution, as it is and always has been our position that neither Mr. Key nor at the time April came down for the purpose of prostitution at all. That's not going to be our presentation.

THE COURT: Okay. I'm still going to hold it in abeyance --

MS. WINSLOW: That's fine.

THE COURT: -- until I hear the evidence. Okay?

MS. SAWYER: Thank you, your Honor.

THE COURT: All right. And then I've got the -- do I have a verdict form that has that breakout now?

MS. SAWYER: You don't, your Honor. The only amendment I made to the verdict form was the defense's request that we put "not guilty" first.

THE COURT: So we need that breakout with the travel. 1 2 MS. SAWYER: Yes. 3 THE COURT: Well, I'll see what you do, if you can run 4 that up today so I can see how you do it, and I'll let you know 5 whether or not it's the way I think it should be done. Okay? 6 MS. SAWYER: Yes, your Honor. THE COURT: All right. Anything else on your side 7 8 from the jury instructions? 9 MS. SAWYER: No, except that I do think that I'll have 10 to make some revisions now, in light of the Court's ruling on 11 the 404(b) evidence. There are one or two that address how the 12 jury is to take that evidence, so I'll have to take those out, 13 but I think that's it. 14 THE COURT: And then what about you, Ms. Winslow? 15 What --16 MS. WINSLOW: That --17 THE COURT: -- do you have? 18 MS. WINSLOW: Pardon me. That was my additional 19 thought. I think Instruction 15 will have to be removed. 20 That's the enlarged part. The government agrees that it's 15? 21 THE COURT: Yeah. That's the 404(b) instruction. 22 MS. SAWYER: Yes, that's correct. 23 MS. WINSLOW: Okay. 24 THE COURT: Anything else? MS. WINSLOW: No, your Honor. 25

MS. WINSLOW: No, your Honor. Our only potential witness would be Mr. Key. I will be happy to provide your Honor with a list of names of the individuals at the table if that would be helpful.

THE COURT: Sure. That would be helpful. And so remind me as we go forward in the trial about -- discuss with your attorney over this weekend whether you want to testify in the case or not. And please know, Mr. Key, that you have a right not to incriminate yourself, so you don't have to testify. And, in fact, you don't have to put on any evidence at all. The government carries the burden in this case.

If you choose not to testify, I will instruct the jury that they make -- may make no assumption of guilt based upon your refusal to testify. But next week I will be asking you this again, and I will be asking you whether you've had a chance to discuss with your attorney the costs and benefits of you taking the witness stand. And when I do that, I will put you under oath, and I will ask you for your answer as to which way you want to go so that you understand that's a constitutional right, and it's one that I need to protect next week when we talk. So discuss this in the coming days as to how you want to proceed. Okay?

THE DEFENDANT: (Nods head.)

THE COURT: All right. Anything else from the government?

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MR. PARENTE: Yes, your Honor. If the Court would be
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     willing to listen to some questions regarding the Court's
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      404(b) ruling in how we present Ms. Crayton's testimony.
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                           Okay. Please, so we make sure we don't
               THE COURT:
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      step in any areas.
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               MS. SAWYER: Your Honor, may I hand up the witness
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      list?
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               THE COURT:
                          Please.
                                    Go ahead.
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          (Tendered.)
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               MR. PARENTE: So we've read the Court's order, and it
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      essentially allows four areas: What the defendant said to
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      April; what the defendant said to Dache about April; what Dache
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      observed the defendant doing to prepare for his travel to
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     Wisconsin to pick up the victim; and what Dache observed April
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      doing while she was with the defendant.
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               THE COURT: Oh. Well, of course, if April is
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      testifying, April can testify about what was said to her and
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     what was -- what she observed --
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               MR. PARENTE: Oh, correct.
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               THE COURT: -- if I didn't include that.
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               MR. PARENTE: That is -- I'm sorry, this is just in
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      the context of Ms. Crayton's testimony.
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               THE COURT:
                           Oh, okay.
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               MR. PARENTE: So the first issue where this would come
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      up would be Ms. Crayton is anticipated to testify that the
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defendant told her, "I am now," after this other prostitute left who we're not going to talk about, he then says, "I'm on my computer looking for new girls to recruit to help us out," and shows her the ad of the girl in Wisconsin and then picks up the phone and starts calling --

THE COURT: Right. That's permissible because that's him making a statement against interest to her regarding his intent to have someone engage in prostitution. That's covered in what defendant said to Crayton.

MR. PARENTE: And then there's going -- there will be testimony from Ms. Crayton about when April is with them, that, you know, they return from Wisconsin and the defendant got them a hotel room at the -- at the hotel, and that's where things Does the Court want me to sanitize that to say -- to happened. have the witness say he paid for just April's hotel room and not Ms. Crayton's hotel room?

THE COURT: No, I don't think that -- I don't think you need to clean it that -- like that.

The risk in the 404(b) is that everything he did prior to this date that you've charged is prejudicial to say that he was doing this all before.

What he did for this victim and during this trip is all relevant for the jury to understand what the relationship was between the two of them.

So his act of paying for the room for both is a factor

1 to be weighed in the totality of the circumstances 2 understanding his intent at the time, so that's not excluded. 3 MR. PARENTE: And then I guess, big picture, for the 4 context of Mrs. Crayton to give these statements to the jury, how would the Court like me to describe her relationship to the 5 defendant? 6 7 THE COURT: So from what I've read and what I've 8 heard, she was -- she was -- she met him a few weeks 9 beforehand? 10 MR. PARENTE: Two weeks prior. 11 THE COURT: And that she was being prostituted by 12 him --13 MR. PARENTE: Correct. 14 THE COURT: -- right? 15 Are they in a relationship? 16 MR. PARENTE: They had a -- somewhat of a relationship. 17 18 THE COURT: So what would she testify if she didn't 19 say -- if I didn't narrow her at all? Tell me what she would 20 say. 21 MR. PARENTE: I would say: How did you meet the 22 defendant? She would say: Two weeks ago, I got into a fight 23 with the man I was staying with, I ran into the defendant in 24 the parking lot, he said come work for me, I had nowhere else to go, I began working for him. 25

THE COURT: But working for him, she's going to have to describe that -- that makes no sense, right? She's going to have to say what her work was.

MR. PARENTE: Correct. And I think to lay the foundation for why, when she tells the jury what the defendant was telling her, why it makes sense that he would have told her that -- like she's in the room with a customer now, she had a date right now -- because that's part of what was going on, versus the jury might be thinking, well, why is he telling this random person --

THE COURT: Yeah.

MR. PARENTE: -- these key details.

THE COURT: I want to think about it. I want to think about what the best way -- I mean, we don't -- we're not going to pull the wool over the eyes of the jury as to what her role is with him; but, on the other hand, he's not charged with, you know, trafficking her, and he's not -- and working for him in the past, makes that relationship of prostitution in the past that isn't charged, so let me think about that, see if I can think of a way to make it more realistic without prejudicing the defendant with propensity evidence.

What else?

MR. PARENTE: And then -- and this might help the Court make that decision.

When the victim actually testifies, she's going to

present testimony that when the defendant first brought her to the hotel, he introduces her to Ms. Crayton. She observes the transactions going on between -- the money exchanged between the defendant and Ms. Crayton, and then he takes her down to the car and presuming in an attempt to groom her says: You know, she does the same thing you do, and I want you -- I post her ads like I'm going to post your ads.

Obviously, that's critical evidence. That's the defendant's own statement. That's an -- and should be admissible.

THE COURT: He's saying that to who?

MR. PARENTE: He's saying that to the victim.

THE COURT: The victim? At the car says she's doing what you're doing? Or what -- that -- what you're going to do?

MR. PARENTE: Correct. I post her ads like I'm going to post your ads.

I mean, so we believe that that's critical direct evidence of this and that might be why in the beginning -- and the Court will have this information. April is going to testify first, so the Court will see this information. It will be out there. So maybe if that comes in, then it's not even a big deal about Dache explaining what she was.

THE COURT: Yeah.

MS. WINSLOW: So I can be very clear, Judge, that the testimony will not be -- at least that hasn't been her

THE COURT: Good for you.

MR. PARENTE: -- and I believe a lot of the cross of Ms. Crayton is going to open up a lot of this as well.

THE COURT: Yeah. So see if you can propose a few lines, and then we'll talk about them beforehand. But I think it's going to be less prejudicial after those statements, admissions of his, if they come in first, if they come in through April first. Okay?

All right. What else?

MS. SAWYER: Your Honor, may I just clarify so I can make sure that we don't make any missteps in eliciting certain testimony? That the Court has said that the defendant's direct statements to April about "I want to introduce you to my friend, she does what you do" would be admissible?

THE COURT: I just said that.

 $\mbox{MS. SAWYER: Okay. I just wanted to make sure that I} \\ \mbox{understood. Thank you.}$

THE COURT: Okay. What else?

MR. PARENTE: The next thing -- and, again, I don't believe this is prohibited under the Court's order. I just wanted to run it by the Court. It's proposed Government Exhibit 44, which the Court doesn't have. It's a text message sent by the defendant to someone on the day that he, in fact, goes and recruits the minor that reads, "I need you, I got too many calls and only one girl."

The government's position is this is some of the best

THE COURT: It's the same day. Isn't that what you

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said?

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MR. PARENTE: It's the same day he starts these conversations with the -- it's the same day he reaches out to April and tries to text her to get her to come to Illinois. It's before he actually drives to Wisconsin.

MS. WINSLOW: But this is another individual who he is talking to. And it's entirely conceivable that he's intending to recruit another individual within the State of Illinois or another individual who is an adult by this text message, but he has an entirely different motivation for going up to Wisconsin to meet April and --

THE COURT: But doesn't that go to the weight of the evidence as opposed to the admissibility of it? Because it's definitely an intent that he needs another girl. Right? On that day at the time that he's communicating with the victim.

MS. WINSLOW: Yes. But then, again, we're opening up all of this background, if you will, of his recruiting other women to work for him. And this text message was to another individual, entirely unrelated to the crime that the government has charged. The government --

THE COURT: Is it going to come in through an agent that searched the phone? Is that how it comes in?

MR. PARENTE: Correct, your Honor. And, again, it's "I've got too many calls and only one girl."

Clearly, defense can argue that he collects girls or does all kind -- it can mean all kinds of things. But there's

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a very fair inference that this is direct evidence that on the same day he reaches out to our victim, that we have to prove that what his intent was to do with her, that this is direct evidence of that, and the jury should be allowed to consider this for what it is.

MS. WINSLOW: It may be direct evidence that he engages in sex trafficking, and he's not -- which he's not charged with, but it's not direct evidence that he recruited April for the purpose of prostitution.

THE COURT: Right. But the difference with it and the other ones, which are just what he did in the past, is that this is during the same time frame that he's communicating with this victim, and their theory of the case is that the intent was to go get her to engage in prostitution. Your theory is that it wasn't. This theory is a reasonable inference that he's telling someone else, "I need another girl," and so as he's linking up with or hooking up with her electronically, that shows intent, and it has the ability to be challenged that it was somebody else and it was never conveyed to her and she never heard it and it wasn't conveyed to, you know, someone else that was dealing with her, she never received it; but that I think goes to weight and not to the fact that it is highly relevant as to his state of mind at the time he's communicating with the victim. So that will come in.

MR. PARENTE: Thank you, your Honor.

And then the last one is hopefully the easiest one. It's just the testimony from the Bolingbrook -- Romeoville police officer that when he goes into the room, he collects the -- in his mind, what he thinks is going on is there's some prostitution activity in the room. I don't believe that is -- under the 404(b) order, I think that's just why he collected the evidence and why he's here introducing prepaid --

THE COURT: Well, no, that's -- he has to state that when he went into the room -- the reason he seized all of those things and the reason I've upheld them is because he identified them as potential evidence of prostitution based upon his experience of doing prostitution investigations. So that can come in.

MR. PARENTE: Okay. That's all that we have, your Honor.

THE COURT: I mean, you know, it's like splitting the baby. Believe me, if you were pre-Gomez, it would have been a different ballgame; but now this kind of splitting of the hairs of dividing the intent with one victim and trying to keep out what was happening with potentially others and other crimes is a challenge for all of us. But in this situation, I think the law is pretty clear that it's a safer route, even for them, to not have it in, and it's a cleaner trial for the defendant to just have what you've charged. So it's -- that's what we're going to try to walk the tightrope of. And we'll do it at

sidebar if it turns out to be a problem. Okay?

MS. WINSLOW: Fine.

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THE COURT: And it's much better to raise it before at sidebar than after and we have to do something to fix it. So if you think something is going to come out in a certain way, raise it with me beforehand. 0kav?

MR. PARENTE: And to that, in that regard, I would proffer to the Court that Ms. Crayton is a reluctant government witness, borderline probably hostile witness, so we will try to prep her. Again, that might not work. But, if necessary, we'll just ask the Court for time to admonish her before she begins testimony.

THE COURT: As in you want me to admonish her?

MR. PARENTE: No, no.

THE COURT: Oh. I'm not going to do that.

MR. PARENTE: Just once we propose the initial line of questioning for her, just if the only time that we can actually get her here is through some sort of compulsory process --

THE COURT: Well, then you should just invoke the rule by the rule number rather than by anything else. Like I don't want you to say, "We want to treat her as a hostile witness." I think that's prejudicial. I think you can -- they won't know the rules.

MR. PARENTE: Yes, your Honor.

THE COURT: All right. Anything else from you?

MS. WINSLOW: The one remaining issue is this -- is the question of April's exercise of Fifth Amendment, and we are I think jointly frustrated by this process because we're having a very, very difficult time getting an answer from her attorney.

MR. O'CONNELL-MILLER: Unfortunately, I also got a message from her attorney during the course of the hearing, so we may have some additional clarification.

THE COURT: So the way this would work is that the -- we can do this -- where is she, by the way? Is she in Madison?

MS. SAWYER: She is, your Honor, yes.

THE COURT: Physically in Madison, right? So she's coming down Monday or something like that for the trial? Is that how it --

MS. SAWYER: In order to prepare for trial, yes.

THE COURT: Okay. So the way we should do it is have her attorney and all of us here in the morning and address what she believes -- her attorney believes is the Fifth Amendment right. He can proffer to me in chambers as to what the scope of that is, and I can make a determination.

Or we can even go one step safer and bring her to the chief judge for such an evaluation if you think that would be a stronger record for each of you, where the attorney proffers the scope of the testimony and why he believes it would incriminate, because then we would need a compulsion order for

the case if it is not something that's protected.

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So what is -- what does he or she think is the incriminating nature?

MR. O'CONNELL-MILLER: We don't know. We have one voice-mail that, in addition to the one I just got, which I have not listened to yet, we have one voice-mail saying that she's going to advise her client to invoke her Fifth Amendment privileges.

THE COURT: Do you think it's for prostitution?

MR. O'CONNELL-MILLER: No. She -- in the voice-mail -- and, again, and I've called back repeatedly trying to get the scope, so I'm hoping this new voice-mail has some clarification. I can run outside and listen to it real quick, if you want.

THE COURT: Why don't you go see if you can.

MR. O'CONNELL-MILLER: Yes.

THE COURT: Is there some evidence of drugs or something that we have to be concerned about?

MS. SAWYER: No, not to my knowledge, your Honor. I spoke to -- well, I spoke to the defense attorney, and my initial understanding was that when she says Fifth Amendment, my understanding was to any questions that relate obviously to that pending case and not to the questions she will be asked regarding this case.

Now, these --

got two days ago, it just says that she -- that Miss Laitsch,

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who is the attorney, is going to advise April to assert her Fifth Amendment rights as a witness, but it's unclear what scope --

THE COURT: Well, maybe she thinks that you're going to talk to her about her pending case. And if that's --

MR. O'CONNELL-MILLER: That's possible.

THE COURT: And so she very clearly is just telling you, "I've told her to invoke her Fifth Amendment privilege if that is what's going to happen," so is it possible we don't just have miscommunication here?

MS. SAWYER: If I may, your Honor, and hopefully what we can do -- and I've proposed that the four of us get on a conference call with the defense attorney, we all make sure that we're all on the same page. My conversation with her way back when was I don't intend to ask her any questions about the pending cases, nothing to do with the case in which she is a testifying victim, and so I thought that was clear; but I think that we can probably resolve this fairly simply if we all get on the phone together.

If there's another issue, we can bring it to the Court.

MR. O'CONNELL-MILLER: I agree with that.

THE COURT: We should raise it first thing in the morning, so you should bring her and her attorney to the 9:30 criminal call on Monday.

been a matter of getting clarification, because the scope of

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to hear it from Ms. Winslow, unless there's a breakdown, okay?
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               THE DEFENDANT: All right.
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               THE COURT: Okay. Thanks very much.
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               MS. SAWYER: Thank you, your Honor.
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               THE COURT:
                           Thank you.
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               LAW CLERK:
                           All rise. Court is adjourned.
          (Proceedings concluded at 11:21 a.m.)
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                           CERTIFICATE
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          I certify that the foregoing is a correct transcript of the
      record of proceedings in the above-entitled matter.
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      /s/ GAYLE A. McGUIGAN
                                                   <u>July 1, 2016</u>
      Gayle A. McGuigan, CSR, RMR, CRR
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      Official Court Reporter
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